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NEW YORK’S LAW OF TAX MALPRACTICE 
DAMAGES: BALANCED OR BIASED? 
JACOB L. TODRES† 
INTRODUCTION 
Generally, in the United States, when a tax advisor is 
negligent and causes damages to his or her client, the most 
commonly encountered recoverable direct damages include: 
(1) additional taxes caused by the negligence, (2) interest paid to 
the government on any tax underpayment, (3) penalties imposed 
by the government for a tax underpayment, and (4) corrective 
costs incurred in attempting to mitigate all or some of the 
foregoing damages.1  In New York, the first two types of 
damages—additional taxes and interest—are not recoverable.  
New York’s position on both of these elements of damages is 
based upon principles enunciated in Alpert v. Shea Gould 
Climenko & Casey.2   
Alpert involved a fraud cause of action asserted against two 
law firms involved with a tax shelter in which the plaintiffs 
invested and which turned out to be ineffective.3  The claim for 
back taxes was dismissed by the trial court on defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment.4  The reason for the dismissal was 
because the court held that under the facts of Alpert a recovery of 
back taxes would put the plaintiffs in a better position than if 
they had never invested in the tax shelter at issue.5  With respect 
to the recovery of the interest paid by the plaintiff on their tax 
underpayment, the First Department reversed the trial court’s 
denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this 
 
† Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the invaluable research assistance of Adam McBeth, class of 2011. 
1 Jacob L. Todres, Tax Malpractice Damages: A Comprehensive Review of the 
Elements and the Issues, 61 TAX LAW. 705, 712 (2008). Other types of damages may 
also be recoverable in appropriate situations. Id. at 736. 
2 160 A.D.2d 67, 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (1st Dep’t 1990). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315. 
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issue and held that such interest does not constitute damages; 
instead, it merely represents an appropriate charge to the 
plaintiffs for the tax money they held during a period of time 
when they were not entitled to hold such money.6 
In my view, New York’s law should be changed with respect 
to both of these elements of damages and both should be 
recoverable as a matter of New York negligence law.  As to the 
recovery of additional taxes, while Alpert’s conclusion that such 
taxes were not recoverable was likely correct under its facts, 
Alpert was addressing damages recoverable in a fraud cause of 
action.7  There is absolutely no reason or justification to extend 
this fraud measure of damages to recoveries in negligence causes 
of action.  Indeed, the application of New York’s well-established 
negligence damage principles would permit the recovery of such 
additional taxes.  The theory of damages in the fraud arena is 
very different from the theory of damages in the negligence 
arena, and it is inexplicable why the fraud rule was transplanted 
into the negligence arena. 
As to Alpert’s position on the non-recoverability of interest, 
while the court’s position may have been both appropriate under 
its facts as well as a progressive divergence from the majority 
view at that time, this position should be changed.  A recent line 
of cases outside New York has developed a more just and 
nuanced approach to this issue which permits a plaintiff to 
recover the difference, if any, between the interest paid the 
government and the actual earnings received by the plaintiff on 
the underpaid taxes.8  New York should adopt this position with 
respect to the recoverability of interest. 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify certain 
preliminary matters.  With respect to additional taxes, it is very 
important to understand that this element of damages addresses 
only the additional taxes caused by a tax advisor’s negligence, 
not those taxes that a plaintiff would owe in any event.  To 
illustrate, assume a plaintiff who would owe taxes of $100,000 if 
her or his tax return was properly prepared, but who paid taxes 
of $120,000 due to the negligence of the tax advisor (that is, 
either deductions were omitted or taxable income was 
 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314. 
8 See Frank v. Lockwood, 749 N.W.2d 443, 454 (Neb. 2008); see also case cited 
infra note 63. 
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overstated).  It is only the recoverability of the additional $20,000 
that is addressed.  The basic, correct $100,000 of taxes owed the 
government may never be collected from the negligent advisor.9 
With respect to damages for interest, this refers only to the 
interest charge imposed by a government on a tax 
underpayment.  Whenever a tax advisor’s negligence results in a 
tax underpayment by the client, such interest will be incurred 
because federal,10 New York,11 and probably most, if not all, other 
state laws12 impose an interest charge on tax underpayments.  
Other types of interest that might be recoverable in appropriate 
tax malpractice situations are not addressed.13 
Generally, in a tax malpractice situation in the United 
States, where an attorney or accountant was negligent in giving 
tax advice, the damages suffered are normally recovered by 
means of a malpractice suit.  Although many different types of 
tort and contract claims are encountered,14 recovery in such 
situations is most often obtained under the traditional tort of 
negligence.15  The elements of this cause of action generally 
include: (1) a duty owed by the defendant attorney or accountant 
to the plaintiff, (2) breach of the duty, (3) injuries suffered by the 
plaintiff, and (4) proximate causation between the breach of duty 
and the injuries.16  Although these four elements generally 
comprise the elements of this cause of action, some states, such 
as New York, list only three elements—negligence, proximate 
cause, and damages—in effect, combining the first two 
elements.17  Other states sometimes add a fifth element—
causation in fact.18 
 
9 The text assumes that the statute of limitations has expired and it is no longer 
possible to obtain the overpayment by simply filing an amended return. 
10 I.R.C. §§ 6621–22 (2006). 
11 N.Y. TAX LAW § 684 (McKinney 2009). 
12 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19101 (West 2000); TEX. TAX CODE 
ANN. §33.01 (West 1998). 
13 See, e.g., Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 797 P.2d 899, 912 (Mont. 
1990) (interest differential between conventional borrowing and tax-exempt 
borrowing); see also Todres, supra note 1, at 753. 
14 Todres, supra note 1, at 709–10. 
15 Id. at 709; see also BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE 
§ 601.1 (6th ed. 2004). 
16 Todres, supra note 1, at 709; WOLFMAN ET AL, supra note 15, § 601.2.1.  
17 See, e.g., Kaminsky v. Herrick, Feinstein LLP, 59 A.D.3d 1, 9, 870 N.Y.S.2d 1, 
7 (1st Dep’t 2008); Estate of Nevelson v. Carro, Spanbock, Kaster & Cuiffo, 259 
A.D.2d 282, 283, 686 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (1st Dep’t 1999); see also Solomon v. City of 
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In Part I, Alpert will be discussed.  Since New York’s law on 
the recovery of interest—actually, on the non-recovery of 
interest—is more definitively established than its position on the 
non-recovery of additional taxes, interest will be discussed first 
in Part II and then additional taxes in Part III.  A conclusion 
follows. 
I. THE ALPERT CASE 
In Alpert, the plaintiff19 invested in a tax shelter whose chief 
attraction was the immediate deduction of advance minimum 
royalty payments for the right to mine coal in the future.20  
Originally, the shelter program contained a tax opinion by one of 
the defendant law firms suggesting the advance minimum 
royalty payment was deductible when made.21  On December 16, 
1977, the Income Tax Regulations were amended to disallow a 
deduction for such advance royalty payments.22  On December 19, 
1977, a Revenue Ruling was issued by the IRS advising that such 
advance royalty payments could be deducted only over the period 
for which they were paid and not in the year of payment.23  In 
light of these developments, the original law firm, on or before 
December 21, 1977, withdrew its previous opinion and expressed 
doubts as to the immediate deductibility of the payments, 
making their earlier opinion useless to the promoter of the tax 
shelter.24  On December 20, 1977, the promoters of the tax shelter 
obtained an opinion from the second defendant law firm in which 
the validity of the Revenue Ruling was questioned.25  Facing a 
substantial income tax liability for 1977, the plaintiff invested 
over $52,000 in the tax shelter on December 30, 1977 and 
claimed a deduction of over $216,000 on his 1977 federal income 
 
New York, 66 N.Y.2d 1026, 1027, 489 N.E.2d 1294, 1294, 499 N.Y.S.2d 392, 392 
(1985) (listing the three elements as duty, breach, and proximate injury). 
18 See, e.g., 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 124–25 (2d ed. 2011). 
19 There were actually two plaintiffs in Alpert, but I will refer to only one 
plaintiff to simplify the presentation. Portions of this paragraph are adapted from 
Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice and the Tax Practitioner: An Analysis of the Areas in 
Which Malpractice Occurs, 48 EMORY L.J. 547, 636–37 (1999). 
20 Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 69, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 
313 (1st Dep’t 1990). 
21 Id. at 69–70, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313–14. 
22 Id. at 70, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313. 
23 Id. 
24 Id., 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314. 
25 Id. at 70–71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314. 
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tax return for advance royalty payments.26  The IRS 
subsequently disallowed the deduction.27  In December 1986, the 
plaintiff paid over $117,400 in back taxes and over $165,800 in 
interest.28 
In 1984, this action was brought against the defendants for 
fraudulent misrepresentation—that is, for fraud.29  The plaintiff 
sought to recover lost profits as well as the tax benefits they 
would have obtained if they had not relied on the defendants’ 
opinions and, instead, invested in a viable tax shelter.30  After 
extensive discovery, the defendants moved for partial summary 
judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for damages for the 
recovery of taxes and interest.31  The lower court granted 
defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment to the extent 
of dismissing damage claims for back taxes, but denied the 
motion with respect to interest.32  Both of these rulings were 
appealed by the losing parties.33 
Turning first to the damage claims for back taxes, the First 
Department affirmed the lower court’s dismissal.  The First 
Department’s reasoning was as follows: 
The recovery of consequential damages naturally flowing from a 
fraud is limited to that which is necessary to restore a party to 
the position occupied before commission of the fraud. . . . [I]n 
the instant case, recovery of back taxes would place plaintiffs in 
a better position than had they never invested in the [tax 
shelter].34 
The court also refused to consider the tax benefit plaintiff could 
have obtained from investing in some other, valid tax shelter  
 
 
26 Id. at 69, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313. 
27 Id. at 70, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313. 
28 Id. Penalties were not assessed against the plaintiff. Id. 
29 Although the opinion notes that plaintiff was “claiming, inter alia, fraudulent 
misrepresentation,” id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314, indicating that other claims were 
also asserted,  the First Department’s opinion refers only to the fraud cause of action 
throughout the opinion. See generally id. 
30 Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314.  
31 Id. The defendants also moved to dismiss claims for penalties incurred by the 
plaintiff, but this is ignored since no penalties were imposed upon the plaintiff. Id. at 
70, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313. 
32 Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314. 
33 Id. Plaintiff also cross-moved for leave to amend the complaint, but this aspect 
of the opinion is ignored since it is not relevant to the issues discussed in this 
Article. Id. 
34 Id. at 71–72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314–15. 
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because “[i]t is also well settled that the victim of fraud may not 
recover the benefit of an alternative agreement overlooked in 
favor of the fraudulent one.”35 
As to damages for interest paid to the IRS, the First 
Department reversed the lower court and held the recovery of 
such amounts was also precluded in New York. 
In Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, . . . a case involving violations 
of federal securities law, the United States Court of Appeals 
found that a defrauded investor in a coal mine tax shelter, 
similar to the one herein, was not entitled to recover interest 
paid to the IRS upon disallowance of tax deductions.  The Court 
reasoned that such interest was not damages suffered by 
plaintiff but rather was a payment to the IRS for his use of the 
money during the period of time when he was not entitled to it.  
There is support for such a result in New York case law as 
well. . . .  Moreover, the equities militate in favor of barring 
recovery of such interest rather than allowing plaintiffs the 
windfall of both having used the tax monies for seven years and 
recovering all interest thereon.36 
Although Alpert has been utilized in determining damages 
recoverable in tort causes of action,37 it must be noted first and 
foremost, that Alpert is purely a fraud case.38  With respect to the 
substantive issues, the opinion never even mentionsmuch less 
addressesany other possible cause of action that one might 
have expected to encounter such as negligence, malpractice, 
breach of contract, etc.  Also, in analyzing Alpert it is essential to 
recognize that Alpert decides three distinct issues, the first two of 
which pertain to back taxes: (1) back taxes may not be recovered 
as damages; (2) a victim of fraud may not recover the benefit of 
an alternative agreement overlooked in favor of the fraudulent 
one; and (3) interest paid to the IRS on a tax underpayment is 
not recoverable as damages.39 
 
35 Id. at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315. 
36 Id. (citation omitted). 
37 See, e.g., Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 384 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), amended by, No. 03 Civ. 6942(SAS), 2004 WL 2403911, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004) (discussing how Alpert is applied by some courts in 
malpractice cases). 
38 Alpert, 160 A.D.2d at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314. 
39 Id. at 71–72, 74, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314–16. 
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Since Alpert seems to have gained the most prominence both 
in New York and elsewhere with respect to the nonrecoverability 
of interest, I will focus on this issue first. 
II. NONRECOVERABILITY OF INTEREST AS DAMAGES 
A. Within New York40 
Although Alpert was not decided by the New York Court of 
Appeals, it is recognized nevertheless, both inside41 and 
outside42of New York, as the case in which New York adopted the 
position that interest paid to a government with respect to a tax 
underpayment is not recoverable as damages.  The reasoning for 
this position is that such interest is not damages but simply a 
payment for the use of money during a period of time that the 
government, not the plaintiff, was entitled to such use.  If such 
interest were recoverable as damages, the plaintiff would have 
the windfall of having both the use of the money and also 
recovering the interest thereon.43 
Approximately twelve years after Alpert another panel of the 
same First Department that decided Alpert decided Jamie 
Towers Housing Co. v. William B. Lucas, Inc.,44 which seems 
fundamentally inconsistent with Alpert.  In Jamie Towers, the 
plaintiff, a residential housing cooperative, incurred over 
$470,000 in interest when its managing agent failed to timely 
pay New York City real estate taxes for the 1991/1992 tax year.45  
 
40 This segment is adapted from Jacob L. Todres, Recovery of Interest on a Tax 
Underpayment Caused by a Tax Advisor’s Negligence, 26 AKRON TAX J. 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter Recovery of Interest]. 
41 See, e.g., Shalam v. KPMG LLP, 43 A.D.3d 752, 754, 843 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (1st 
Dep’t 2007); Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. Sol Masch & Co., 40 A.D.3d 282, 283, 
835 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (1st Dep’t 2007); Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & 
Berger, 303 A.D.2d 249, 249, 755 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (1st Dep’t 2003), aff’d, 44 A.D.3d 
554, 844 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1st Dep’t 2007); Blumberg v. Altman, No. 118264/06, 15 
Misc. 3d 1140(A), 2007 WL 1519067, at *2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. May 25, 2007); Thies 
v. Bryan Cave LLP, No. 601036/05, 13 Misc. 3d 1220(A), 2006 WL 2883815, at *4–5 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Mar. 14, 2006), aff’d, 35 A.D.3d 252, 826 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dep’t 
2006). 
42 See, e.g., Frank v. Lockwood, 749 N.W.2d 443, 451–53 (Neb. 2008); Amato v. 
KPMG LLP, No. 06cv39, 2006 WL 2376245, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006); O’Bryan 
v. Ashland, 717 N.W.2d 632, 637 (S.D. 2006); see also Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 
384. 
43 Alpert, 160 A.D.2d at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315. 
44 296 A.D.2d 359, 745 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1st Dep’t 2002). 
45 Id. at 359, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533. 
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In this suit the plaintiff was seeking to recover the interest from 
its former managing agent and its former accountant.  The lower 
court dismissed the complaint on defendants’ summary judgment 
motion based upon Alpert.46  The First Department reversed, 
holding Alpert inapposite.  The First Department’s analysis, in 
its entirety follows: 
Here, however, plaintiff, allegedly through no fault of its own, 
was unnecessarily caused to pay $473,043 in interest to the City 
due to its managing agent’s failure to timely pay certain real 
estate taxes for the 1991/1992 tax year.  As such, the recovery of 
such interest as an element of its damages would not constitute 
an impermissible windfall or put plaintiff in a “better position” 
than it was in prior to its managing agent’s alleged misfeasance 
and it should be entitled to prove such damages, if any.  Those 
would ordinarily be measured not by the difference in interest 
rates charged by the City and the IRS, but by the actual amount 
of interest and late charges paid to the City due to the alleged 
misfeasance, subject to any offset of the actual income derived 
from the funds in question during the relevant period of time.47 
It is very difficult to understand why Alpert is 
distinguishable.  In both situations the plaintiff ended up 
retaining possession of money he, or it, was not entitled to.  In 
Jamie Towers it was due to the error of the managing agent in 
not paying real estate taxes.48  In Alpert it was due to the error of 
the tax advisor in advising the plaintiff that he had legitimate 
tax reductions.49  In both situations the plaintiffs had the use of 
money until the error was discovered and the money repaid.  Yet 
in Jamie Towers the First Department held the recovery of 
interest was not an impermissible windfall,50 while in Alpert it 
held it would be.51  
While there are some salient factual differences between the 
cases, the differences are inconsequential.  For instance, in Alpert 
the plaintiff intentionally sought the tax shelter and 
intentionally utilized it and paid less taxes than otherwise would 
 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 359–60, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533–34 (citations omitted).  
48 Id. at 359, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533. 
49 Alpert, 160 A.D.2d at 70–71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314. 
50 Jamie Towers, 296 A.D.2d at 359, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533. In Jamie Towers the 
measure of damages adopted by the court was the difference between the interest 
paid reduced by the actual income derived from the money during the relevant time. 
Id. at 360, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 534. 
51  Alpert, 160 A.D.2d at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315. 
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have been payable, while in Jamie Towers the underpayment 
arose inadvertently due to an error.  Also, Alpert involved 
underpayment of income taxes while Jamie Towers involved 
underpayment of city real estate taxes.  However, these seem to 
be distinctions without differences, since in both instances the 
end result is identicaleach plaintiff had use of a sum of money 
to which he, or it, was not entitled. 
Despite the fact that Jamie Towers seems to be 
fundamentally inconsistent with Alpert, many later cases simply 
cite Alpert for the no-recovery-of-interest proposition and never 
even bother to cite Jamie Towers.52  While some cases do address 
the existence of Jamie Towers,53 and attempt to distinguish it, 
their reasons for distinguishing it do not seem compelling.  For 
instance, in Thies v. Bryan Cave LLP, a case involving a suit 
against two law firms that gave opinions with respect to 
investments in an ineffective tax shelter, the court distinguished 
Jamie Towers because in Thies the plaintiffs intentionally 
decided not to pay the taxes in question.54  It is difficult to 
comprehend why this makes any difference.  In both instances 
the plaintiff had the use of tax money that belonged to the 
government.  And Jamie Towers held that in such circumstances 
a plaintiff may recover as damages the difference between the 
interest paid the government and the actual income earned by 
the plaintiff on these funds.55 
Similarly, in Shalam v. KPMG LLP, which also involved a 
suit against a tax advisor for advice to invest in a bad tax shelter, 
the First Department held interest was not recoverable based 
upon Alpert.56  The court held Jamie Towers was distinguishable 
 
52 Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. Sol Masch & Co., 40 A.D.3d 282, 283, 835 
N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (1st Dep’t 2007); Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger, 
303 A.D.2d 249, 249, 755 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (1st Dep’t 2003), aff’d, 44 A.D.3d 554, 
844 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1st Dep’t 2007); Blumberg v. Altman, No. 118264/06, 15 Misc. 3d 
1140(A), 2007 WL 1519067, at *2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. May 25, 2007); Rosenbach v. 
Diversified Grp., Inc., No. 602463/2005, 12 Misc. 3d 1152(A), 2006 WL 1310656, at 
*6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. May 10, 2006), aff’d, 85 A.D.3d 569, 926 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st 
Dep’t 2011); Williams v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., No. 600808/05, 11 
Misc. 3d 1064(A), 2006 WL 684599, at *7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Mar. 13, 2006). 
53 Shalam v. KPMG LLP, 43 A.D.3d 752, 754–55, 843 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (1st Dep’t 
2007); Thies v. Bryan Cave LLP, No. 601036/05, 13 Misc. 3d 1220(A), 2006 WL 
2883815, at *4−5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Mar. 14, 2006), aff’d, 35 A.D.3d 252, 826 
N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dep’t 2006). 
54 Thies, 2006 WL 2883815, at *5. 
55 Jamie Towers, 296 A.D.2d at 359–60, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533–34. 
56 43 A.D.3d at 753, 843 N.Y.S.2d at 18–19. 
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because it involved “negligence by an accountant or other agent 
resulting in exposure to liability that would not have been 
incurred ‘but for their accountant’s negligence.’ ”57  Again, 
whether paying interest for the use of funds one is not entitled to 
does or does not constitute recoverable damages should not 
depend on how the funds were obtained.  Also, the lower court in 
Shalam seems to have decided that Alpert governed rather than 
Jamie Towers since the facts of Shalam and Alpert were more 
analogous, since each involved a bad tax shelter.58 
While Alpert has been followed with respect to the non-
recoverability of interest and Jaimie Towers has been virtually 
invisible, in Apple Bank for Savings v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
LLP,59 a trial court within the First Department followed Jamie 
Towers and had a very original and novel interpretation limiting 
what Alpert stood for with respect to the recoverability of 
interest.  In Apple Bank, the issue before the court involved 
whether the defendant accounting firm gave the plaintiff bank 
incorrect advice concerning the tax consequences of a stock 
redemption by the bank from the estate of its sole shareholder.  
The case arose on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
dismissing the complaint.60  Although most of the decision 
involved statute of limitations issues, one of the grounds asserted 
for dismissal was that under Alpert any interest and back taxes 
incurred by the bank were not recoverable.61  In denying the 
motion for summary judgment, the court combined the issue of 
the recoverability of interest together with the issue of the 
recoverability of back taxes and treated them together.  The court 
read Alpert very narrowly to prevent the recovery of interest and 
back taxes only where the plaintiff inevitably would have 
incurred the tax liability even if the plaintiff had not relied on 
the faulty tax advice.  “However, if the tax liability would have 
been avoided but for the erroneous advice, it appears 
 
57 Id. at 754–55, 843 N.Y.S.2d at 19 (quoting Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 
347, 355 (D.N.J. 1999)). 
58 Shalam v. KPMG LLP, No. 112732/05, 13 Misc. 3d 1205(A), 2006 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 2380, at *12 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 8, 2006), aff’d, 43 A.D.3d 752, 753, 843 
N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (1st Dep’t 2007). 
59 No. 603492/06, 23 Misc. 3d 1126(A), 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1176 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 70 A.D.3d 438, 438, 895 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (1st 
Dep’t 2010). 
60 Id. at *1. 
61 Id. at *6. 
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that . . . interest would be recoverable in order to make the 
plaintiff whole.”62  As authority for this proposition the court 
cited Jamie Towers and Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & 
Berger.63  Penner, however, is a very short opinion in which the 
court’s entire focus on the recovery of interest—and back taxes—
was to uphold the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s cause of 
action “since plaintiff’s tax liability was not attributable to an act 
or omission on defendants’ part.”64  This hardly seems an 
adequate basis for such a dramatic narrowing of Alpert from 
simply holding there is never any recovery of interest in such 
situations because the payment of interest does not constitute 
damages. 
While Apple Bank is a recent and most interesting limitation 
of Alpert, (a) it is a lower court holding, (b) Apple Bank was 
reversed by the First Department on statute of limitations 
grounds,65 (c) Penner seems to be very weak, if any, authority, 
and (d) in light of the history of invisibility of Jamie Towers, it is 
unclear how strong the Jamie Towers precedent is.  Accordingly, 
it is impossible to assess whether Apple Bank has effectively 
restricted Alpert’s holding with respect to the nonrecoverability 
of interest as damages in tax malpractice situations.  A lower 
court recently did follow Apple Bank on this point.66 
B. The National Picture67 
Nationally, three views have developed with respect to the 
recoverability of interest on a tax underpayment.  The majority 
view, which is the more established traditional view, is that such 
 
62 Id. The court’s holding also applied to the recoverability of additional taxes 
caused by the defendant’s negligent advice. Id. 
63 Id. at *6–7. The court actually cited Penner first as a parenthetical. Id. 
64 Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger, 303 A.D.2d 249, 249, 755 
N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (1st Dep’t 2003). 
65 Apple Bank for Sav. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 70 A.D.3d 438, 438, 895 
N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (1st Dep’t 2010) (holding that there was no continuous 
representation and therefore the statute of limitations barred plaintiff’s cause of 
action). 
66 Shaiman v. Carpet One of the Hamptons, Inc., No. BRC 208-08, 27 Misc. 3d 
1232(A), 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1551, at *9 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. June 9, 2010). 
67 In Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, I examined in tiresome detail the 
development of the various national views on the recovery of interest as damages in 
a tax malpractice action. I do not intend to repeat that analysis here. Instead, I hope 
to present the conclusion from that study in a somewhat conclusory manner. Anyone 
interested in a more detailed analysis is referred to that work. A portion of this 
section is adapted from Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 3–6. 
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interest is recoverable from a defendant just like any other 
damages proximately caused.  The minority view, which is the 
New York view, absolutely prohibits the recovery of such 
interest.  This view developed in the decade from approximately 
1986 to 1996.  A third “modern” view which initially started in 
1999 is an intermediate view that permits the recovery of such 
interest, but only to the extent it exceeds the interest actually 
earned by the plaintiff on the underpaid taxes.68 
In Recovery of Interest, I attempted to tally the number of 
states following each view based on reported cases.69  Subject to a 
number of caveats, I concluded that as of June 2009, thirteen, or, 
probably, fourteen states followed the traditional majority view,70 
four states—including New York—followed the minority view,71 
and seven states plus the federal district court in Oregon 
followed the intermediate, “modern” view.72  The starting point in 
 
68 Id. at 3–4. 
69 Id. at 15, 17–18, 21, 28–30. 
70 These thirteen states are Alabama, Jamison, Money, Farmer & Co. v. 
Standeffer, 678 So. 2d 1061, 1064–67 (Ala. 1996); Arizona, Jobe v. Int’l Ins. Co., 933 
F. Supp. 844, 860 (D. Ariz. 1995), order withdrawn pursuant to settlement, 1 F. 
Supp. 2d 1403, 1403 (D. Ariz. 1997); Florida, Jones v. Childers, No. 88-85-CIV-T-
22C, 1992 WL 300845, at *12 (M.D. Fla. June 26, 1992), aff’d and rev’d on other 
grounds, 18 F.3d 899, 916 (11th Cir. 1994); Illinois, Jerry Clark Equip., Inc. v. 
Hibbits, 612 N.E.2d 858, 861–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th 1993); Dail v. Adamson, 570 
N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d 1991); Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 413 N.E.2d 47, 51, 
53, 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 1980); Iowa, Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154, 155–
56 (Iowa 1975); Louisiana, Slaughter v. Roddie, 249 So. 2d 584, 586 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
1971); Maryland, Shofer v. Stuart Hack Co., 723 A.2d 481, 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1999); Nevada, Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282, 1284 n.2 (Nev. 1984); North 
Carolina, Estate of Smith v. Underwood, 487 S.E.2d 807, 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); 
Ohio, Hall v. Gill, 670 N.E.2d 503, 506, 510 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st 1995); Wyatt v. Smith, 
Nos. 92 CA 104, 91 CV 400, 1993 WL 518630, at *1, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dec. 15, 
1993); Harrell v. Crystal, 611 N.E.2d 908, 913–14 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th 1992); 
Oklahoma, King v. Neal, 19 P.3d 899, 900–02 (Okla. Civ. App. 4th 2001); Wynn v. 
Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Okla. Civ. App. 2d 1991), overruled by Stroud 
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 37 P.3d 783, 795 & n.58 (Okla. 2001) (overruled on 
another issue); Wisconsin, Merriam v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 98-2522-FT, 1999 WL 
326183, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 25, 1999); and, Wyoming, Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 
P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1984). The fourteenth state that probably also belongs in this 
group is Oregon. See McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 971 P.2d 414, 419 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1998). 
71 The other three states are Alaska, Orsini v. Bratten, 713 P.2d 791, 794 
(Alaska 1986); California, Eckert Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1235 
(E.D. Cal. 1996); and Washington, Leendertsen v. Price Waterhouse, 916 P.2d 449, 
451 (Wash. Ct. App. 1st 1996). 
72 The seven states are Massachusetts, Miller v. Volk, 825 N.E.2d 579, 582 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005); Nebraska, Frank v. Lockwood, 749 N.W.2d 443, 452–53 (Neb. 
2008); New Jersey, Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354–55 (D.N.J. 1999); 
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analyzing this area is the traditional and majority view that 
permitted the recovery of interest on underpaid taxes as a simple 
application of traditional tort damage principles.  Under 
traditional tort doctrine, a plaintiff may recover all damages 
proximately caused by a defendant’s negligence.73  But for 
defendant’s negligently incorrect advice that caused the plaintiff 
to underpay his taxes, the interest would not have been incurred.  
It is therefore held to be recoverable.74 
Over time, a great injustice was perceived with the 
traditional approach since the recovery of such interest as an 
ordinary element of recoverable damages resulted, or could 
result, in a windfall for the plaintiff.  The plaintiff would now 
enjoy both the use of the underpaid tax money and also recover 
the interest paid for the use of this money.75  This caused the 
birth of the minority view which absolutely prohibited the 
recovery of this interest as damages.  According to the minority 
view, the interest charged for a tax underpayment is not a 
penalty imposed on the plaintiff.  Instead, it is merely a justified 
charge for the use of money belonging to the government that 
was wrongfully held by the plaintiff.  If the plaintiff is permitted 
to recover this interest from the defendant, it would result in an 
interest-free loan to the plaintiff for the period the taxes were 
unpaid.76 
While the minority view remedied the problem of unjust 
enrichment of the plaintiff, it created a different injustice.  It 
failed to compensate the plaintiff who did not earn as much with 
the underpaid tax money as he paid the government for the use 
of this money.  By absolutely prohibiting the recovery of interest, 
the minority view irrebuttably presumed that the value of the 
underpaid tax money to the plaintiff was always exactly equal to 
 
Pennsylvania, Amato v. KPMG LLP, No. 06cv39, 2006 WL 2376245, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 
Aug. 14, 2006); South Dakota, O’Bryan v. Ashland, 717 N.W.2d 632, 638–39 (S.D. 
2006); Texas, Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 734–35 (5th Cir. 2000), abrogated by 
Finger v. Ray, 326 S.W.3d 285, 292 (Tex. App. 1st 2010) (abrogated on another 
issue); and Virginia, Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 384–
85 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In King v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. CV 04-1029-HU, 2005 WL 
611954, at *38 (D. Or. Mar. 8, 2005), the federal district court adopted the interest 
differential approach, but never indicated that this was the Oregon position. See 
Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 15. 
73 See Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 17. 
74 Id. at 26. 
75 Id. at 4. 
76 Id.  
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the interest paid to the government and that these amounts 
always net out, leaving no injury and no recoverable damages.77  
There are, however, several practical problems with this 
assumption.  Initially, the minority’s approach assumes the 
plaintiff has available money to invest equal to the tax 
underpayment, the earnings on which will offset the interest paid 
on the tax underpayment.  Frequently, a plaintiff will not have 
available funds to invest, so there will not be earnings to offset 
the interest paid the government.78  Also, even if adequately 
liquid, a plaintiff often will not be able to earn a rate of return on 
his or her investible funds as high as that charged by the 
government.  Additionally, there may be significant hardship to a 
plaintiff who must make an unexpected payment to the 
government that is also ignored by the minority view.79 
To remedy these problems inherent in the minority view, the 
modern, intermediate view developed that avoided irrebuttable 
presumptions and attempted to apply more exacting and precise 
justice.  Under this modern view, interest could be recovered as 
damages, but only when, and to the extent, the interest paid the 
government on the tax underpayment exceeded the amount 
earned on this money by the plaintiff.80  Proving this interest 
differential could be quite burdensome and the placement of the 
burden of proof could be determinative of whether any interest 
damages would actually be recovered.  To address this issue, the 
modern view has developed two different approaches with 
respect to the placement of the burden of proof.  Each state 
adopting this view selected the approach most consistent with its 
tort law.  Under one approach there is a basic assumption that 
the victimized plaintiff is entitled to recover all interest paid the 
government, but the defendant may present evidence of any 
amounts earned by the plaintiff on the tax underpayment in 
reduction of plaintiff’s damages.  The burden of proof is thus 
 
77 Id. at 6. 
78 Id.; see also Wynn v. Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Okla. Civ. App. 
1991), overruled by Stroud v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 37 P.3d 783, 795 & n.58 (Okla. 
2001) (overruled on another issue). 
79 Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 6; see Caroline Rule, What and When 
Can a Taxpayer Recover from a Negligent Tax Advisor?, 92 J. TAX’N 176, 177 (2000). 
80 Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 4. The seminal cases for this view are 
Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354–55 (D.N.J. 1999), and Streber v. 
Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 734–35 (5th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Finger v. Ray, 326 
S.W.3d 285, 292 (Tex. App. 2010) (abrogated on another issue). 
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upon the defendant.81  The other approach seems to assume that 
generally interest on a tax underpayment is not recoverable, but 
if a plaintiff establishes the existence of an interest differential, 
the differential is recoverable as damages.  The burden of proof is 
therefore on the plaintiff.82 
C. Alpert’s No-Interest-Recovery Rule Should Be Changed 
New York’s position, adopted in Alpert,83 that interest on a 
tax underpayment may not be recovered as damages in a tax 
malpractice action should be changed.  In accordance with the 
national trend, New York should adopt the modern view and 
permit the recovery as damages of any differential between the 
interest paid the government on a tax underpayment and any 
earnings realized on this money by a plaintiff.84  In accordance 
with established New York principles that a plaintiff in a tort 
action must prove his or her damages,85 New York should impose 
the burden of proving the interest differential on the plaintiff. 
The weakness of Alpert’s no-interest-recovery position is 
especially evident when viewed through a national lens.  Of the 
three positions nationally on this issue, the no-interest-recovery 
position is a very distinct minority view.86  This view has gained 
no new adherents since it was originally developed from 
approximately 1986 to 1996.87  Furthermore, and more telling, 
 
81 Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 10. This is the approach of Ronson, 33 
F. Supp. 2d at 354. O’Bryan v. Ashland, 717 N.W.2d 632, 639 (S.D. 2006), followed 
this approach though it refused to explicitly decide this point. 
82 This is the approach of Streber, 221 F.3d at 734–35. Other jurisdictions that 
seem to follow this approach include Pennsylvania, Amato v. KPMG LLP, No. 
06cv39, 2006 WL 2376245, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006); Nebraska, Frank v. 
Lockwood, 749 N.W.2d 443, 452–53 (Neb. 2008); Massachusetts, Miller v. Volk, 825 
N.E.2d 579, 581 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); and perhaps the United States District for 
the District of Oregon, King v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. CV 04-1029-HU, 2005 WL 
611954, at *37 (D. Or. 2005). 
83 Since it is still too early to predict whether Apple Bank for Savings v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, No. 603492/06, 23 Misc. 3d 1126(A), 2009 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 1176, at *6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 70 A.D.3d 438, 895 
N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep’t 2010), has successfully limited the scope of Alpert’s strict no-
interest-recovery position, it will be ignored herein. Regardless of whether Alpert is 
still in full force, or somewhat limited, it should be abandoned in favor of the modern 
view. 
84 This is what Jamie Towers did. See text accompanying notes 44–51. 
85 See, e.g., Vooth v. McEachen, 181 N.Y. 28, 31, 73 N.E. 488, 489 (1905); Quinn 
v. Van Pelt, 56 N.Y. 417, 419 (1874). 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 67–71. 
87 See Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 26. 
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since 1999 when the new, more nuanced, and more just modern 
view arose, all cases deciding this issue as a matter of first 
impression adopted the modern view.88  Outside of New York, 
only two cases decided since the advent of the modern view in 
1999 have followed the no-interest-recovery view and both did so 
under the constraint of stare decisis.89  
The no-interest view should be changed not simply as a 
matter of blindly following the leader or a current fad, but 
because the rationale for the approach is no longer compelling 
when compared with the modern view.  The critique of the 
rationale of the nointerest view by proponents of the modern 
intermediate view seems correct.  The rationale for the no-
interest view enunciated by Alpert is that the interest charge is 
not damages but rather a payment for the use of money during a 
period of time the plaintiff was not entitled to the money.90  As 
indicated above, apart from the question of whether the plaintiff 
actually had available to invest an amount equal to the tax 
underpayment, the Alpert rationale assumes the plaintiff would 
earn a rate of return on the money as high as that charged by the 
government for the tax underpayment.91  This assumption is 
frequently incorrect, and it seems absurd to elevate the 
assumption to an irrefutable presumption.  This is especially true 
when the existence of any interest differential can effectively be 
handled jurisprudentially by imposing the burden of proving it 
either on the plaintiff or the defendant as different adherents of 
the modern view have done.92  
 
 
88 See cases cited supra note 72; see also Recovery of Interest, supra note 40, at 
10, 22. 
89 See Fallon v. Locke, Liddell & Sapp, LLP, No. C-04-03210 RMW, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 67708, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2008); Malone v. Nuber, No. C07-
2046RSL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48461, at *49–50 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2008), aff’d 
sub nom., Malone v. Ahrens & DeAngeli, PLLC, No. 10-35882, 2011 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16091, at *3–6 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2011). Malone is especially noteworthy 
because in simply following the earlier case of Leendertsen v. Price Waterhouse, 916 
P.2d 449, 451 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), it even repeated Leendertsen’s erroneous 
statement that the no-interest view is the majority view. Malone, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48461, at *50. 
90 Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 
315 (1st Dep’t 1990). 
91 See supra text accompanying notes 77–79. 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 80–82. 
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While Alpert did not dwell at length on the no-interest-
recovery issue, but simply adopted the rationale stated in Freschi 
v. Grand Coal Venture,93  I believe Alpert was very discerning 
and progressive when handed down.  At that time the prevailing 
view was the majority view that simply awarded interest as a 
routine element of recoverable damages.  By adopting the 
rationale of the federal securities law, Alpert avoided the 
injustice inherent in the majority view that resulted in a windfall 
to plaintiffs at the expense of defendants.  Along the way, Alpert 
was instrumental in the development of the minority view 
nationally. 
After adopting the Freschi rationale that interest did not 
constitute damages and noting the existence of a New York case 
that was arguably consistent, the Alpert court added:  “Moreover, 
the equities militate in favor of barring recovery of such interest 
rather than allowing plaintiffs the windfall of both having used 
the tax moneys for seven years and recovering all interest 
thereon.”94 
This sentence demonstrates that the court was weighing 
only two choices: awarding plaintiff all the interest, and thereby 
giving him a windfall, or awarding no interest.  The court chose 
the latter.  Apparently, the middle ground that later became the 
modern view of awarding plaintiff only the actual interest 
differential, thereby eliminating the windfall element, was not on 
the court’s radar screen.  Today, when the middle ground is 
available, it should be the course of choice.  The course chosen by 
Alpert was simply a reaction—really an overreaction—against 
the unjust majority approach at a time when the only perceived 
options were to award all interest or no interest. 
There is yet an additional reason why Alpert’s no-interest-
recovery rule should not be, and, perhaps, never should have 
been applied to tax malpractice cases.  As will be developed more 
fully in Part III, Alpert is purely a fraud case.  The opinion does 
not even mention any other possible cause of action.95  Tax 
malpractice cases are tort cases, typically negligence cases.96  
And the measure of damages in each area is very different from 
 
93 767 F.2d 1041, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1015 
(1986). 
94 Alpert, 160 A.D.2d at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315 (emphasis added). 
95 See generally id. 
96 See supra text accompanying notes 14–15. 
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the other.  In fraud situations the measure of damages in New 
York is determined under the “out-of-pocket” rule.97  Under this 
rule, damages are determined very narrowly.  They are intended 
solely to compensate the defrauded party for the difference 
between the amount paid and the value of what was received as 
of the time of the transaction.  What the defrauded party might 
have gained, such as lost profits, may not be recovered.98  In 
negligence cases, the measure of damages is intended to 
compensate the injured party so that he may recover the 
difference between what was actually received and what would 
have been received with non-negligent performance, including 
any lost profit.99  
While Alpert held that interest paid a government on 
underpaid taxes does not constitute damages and is not 
recoverable in a fraud context, perhaps a different result might 
have been reached if the broader negligence measure of damages 
had been applied.  In any event, though perhaps different from 
additional taxes, here too a more deliberate and thoughtful 
analysis seems required before simply applying a holding from a 
fraud case to a negligence situation. 
III. ALPERT AND TAXES 
A. Alpert and the Fraud Measure of Damages 
In contemplating the impact of Alpert on the issue of 
whether taxes incurred by a victim of tax malpractice are 
recoverable from a negligent professional, the issue is not really 
what Alpert did, but rather what has been done with Alpert.  
Alpert involved only a fraud cause of action, and Alpert’s holdings 
on the tax issues—that taxes are not recoverable and that any 
tax savings that might have been realized from an alternative 
investment are not relevant—seem correct, and are a simple 
application of traditional New York law as to the fraud measure 
of damages.  As such, Alpert has been followed in fraud cases100 
 
97 See infra text accompanying notes 105–17 and 123–35. 
98 See infra text accompanying notes 105–17 and 123–35. 
99 See infra text accompanying notes 142–57. 
100 See, e.g., Huang v. Sy, No. 15155/90, 18 Misc. 3d 1141(A), 2008 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 793, at *12 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Feb. 28, 2008); Superior Technical Res., 
Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 2003-10104, 17 Misc. 3d 1137(A), 2007 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 8053, at *15 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cnty. Dec. 7, 2007); Imaging Int’l v. Hell Graphic 
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and expressly approved by the New York Court of Appeals.101  
However, this fraud measure of damages has been transported to 
negligence situations without any analysis, and without even any 
acknowledgement that a rule of damages in one area of law is 
being extended into another area.102  Based on a simple review of 
New York’s approach to damages in the fraud and negligence 
areas, it is clear that the fraud measure of damages is not proper 
in a negligence context.  The fraud approach is problematic both 
because it may lead to an incorrect result in any given negligence 
situation, but also, and more importantly, even where the correct 
ultimate result is reached, because the negligence rule of law 
pertaining to  damages is being distorted. 
Rather than summarize Alpert’s holdings with respect to the 
recovery of taxes, it is more efficient to simply quote them since 
the entire holdings on taxes are contained in two paragraphs.  To 
briefly review the facts, with respect to the recovery of taxes 
incurred by the plaintiff who purchased an invalid tax shelter 
about which the defendant law firms had given opinions, the 
lower court in Alpert granted the defendants’ motion for partial 
summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claim for back taxes.  In 
affirming this portion of the lower court’s holding, Alpert stated:  
The IAS court was correct in rejecting plaintiffs’ damage 
claims for back taxes.  The recovery of consequential damages 
naturally flowing from a fraud is limited to that which is 
necessary to restore a party to the position occupied before 
commission of the fraud. . . .  In Cayuga Harvester, the Fourth 
Department found that the destruction of the plaintiffs’ crop 
was a direct result of defendants’ fraud and placed plaintiff in a 
far worse position than had it not purchased the equipment.  By 
contrast, in the instant case, recovery of back taxes would place 
plaintiffs in a better position than had they never invested in 
the [tax shelter]. 
 
Sys., Inc., No. 005062/1992, 17 Misc. 3d 1123(A), 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7368, at *8 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 29, 2007). 
101 Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 422–23, 668 N.E.2d 
1370, 1374, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 80–81 (1996). 
102 See, e.g., Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. Sol Masch & Co., 40 A.D.3d 282, 
282–83, 835 N.Y.S.3d 178, 178 (1st Dep’t 2007); Shaiman v. Carpet One of The 
Hamptons, Inc., No. BRC 208-08, 27 Misc. 3d 1232(A), 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1551, 
at *9 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. June 9, 2010); Apple Bank for Sav. v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, No. 603492/06, 23 Misc. 3d 1126(A), 2009 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 1176, at *6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 70 A.D.3d 438, 895 
N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep’t 2010). 
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It is also well settled that the victim of fraud may not 
recover the benefit of an alternative agreement overlooked in 
favor of the fraudulent one.  Hence, plaintiffs’ argument that 
but for the fraud they would have invested in some other tax 
shelter must fail.103 
What is very clear from this excerpt is that Alpert is opining 
as to damages recoverable in a fraud cause of action.  The court 
reiterates several times that it is addressing the “damages 
naturally flowing from a fraud” and what “the victim of fraud” 
may or may not recover.104  As such, the opinion is simply 
following well-settled precedent and is not especially noteworthy 
except, perhaps, as to its application in a tax shelter situation. 
In New York, the current view of the damages recoverable in 
a fraud action dates back over ninety years to Reno v. Bull.105  
Reno involved a suit to recover damages for fraud and deceit by a 
plaintiff who was induced to purchase stock in a corporation 
based upon misrepresentations of the corporation’s assets and 
prospects.  In setting forth the correct measure of damages, the 
New York Court of Appeals held the purpose of damages in such 
situations is to indemnify the injured party “for the actual 
pecuniary loss sustained as the direct result of the wrong.”106  No 
element of profit may be awarded.  Under the facts of Reno, such 
damages would be the difference between the $5,000 paid for the 
stock and the actual value of the stock received.107 
Almost nine years after Reno the New York Court of Appeals 
revisited this issue, again in the context of a suit for damages 
sustained when the plaintiff was induced by fraudulent 
representations to purchase a bond for investment.108  In 
Hotaling, the court reaffirmed its holding in Reno that the 
measure of damages for fraud “is indemnity for the actual 
pecuniary loss sustained as the direct result of the wrong”109 and 
that ordinarily, when fraud induced the purchase of property, the 
damages would be the difference between the amount paid and 
 
103 Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 71–72, 559 N.Y.S.2d 
312, 314–15 (1st Dep’t 1990) (citations omitted). 
104 Id.  
105 226 N.Y. 546, 124 N.E. 144 (1919). 
106 Id. at 553, 124 N.E. at 146. 
107 Id. at 552–53, 124 N.E. at 146. The court also permitted the recovery of 
interest. Id. at 553, 124 N.E. at 146. 
108 Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 84, 159 N.E. 870 (1928). 
109 Id. at 87, 159 N.E. at 871 (quoting Reno, 226 N.Y. at 553, 124 N.E. at 146). 
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the value of the property received.110  The court went on to 
explain the reason for this is that the seller’s fraud is normally 
completed at the time of sale of the property.  Any subsequent 
changes in value of the article are due to later decisions, such as, 
whether to hold or dispose the asset, and are not attributable to 
the fraud at the time of the sale.111  The court went on to caution 
that the fraud measure of damages was not intended to be 
inflexible, and that even consequential damages might be 
appropriate:  “Proximate damages may not be fixed by arbitrary 
rule.  Sometimes other damages flow from fraud in inducing a 
purchase, besides the difference between the price paid and the 
value of the article received.  Consequential damages may also be 
awarded.”112 
Only eight years after Hotaling, the Court of Appeals again 
reiterated its Reno articulation of the measure of damages for 
fraud.  Sager v. Friedman involved a plaintiff who was 
fraudulently induced to lend money to a corporation.113  The 
president of the corporation had obtained the loan, in part by 
giving as security for the loan certain shares of stock of another 
corporation he owned.114  He misled the plaintiff as to the value of 
the security shares by failing to inform him of certain substantial 
debt owed by that corporation.115  In distinguishing the measure 
of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation from that for breach 
of contract the court stated that in fraud situations, the injury is 
the inducement to make a contract that would not otherwise 
have been made.116  The court added that all profit elements are 
excluded from damages and that damages consist solely of 
“indemnity for the actual pecuniary loss sustained as a direct 
result of the wrong” and that this is “the difference between the 
value of the bargain which a plaintiff was induced by fraud to 
make and the amount or value of the consideration exacted as 
the price of the bargain.”117   
 
110 Id. at 87–88, 159 N.E. at 871. 
111 Id. at 88, 159 N.E. at 871. 
112 Id. at 92, 159 N.E. at 873. 
113 270 N.Y. 472, 477–78, 1 N.E.2d 971, 972–73 (1936). 
114 Id. at 476, 1 N.E.2d at 971–72. 
115 Id. at 477, 1 N.E.2d at 972. 
116 Id. at 481, 1 N.E.2d at 974 (“[T]he measure of damages is indemnity for loss 
suffered through that inducement.”). 
117 Id. (citing Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 553, 124 N.E. 144, 146 (1919)). 
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With the measure of damages for fraud having been firmly 
established by the Court of Appeals and having since been 
applied by the lower courts,118 the holding in Alpert was very 
much in line with the New York precedent.119  When the plaintiff 
in Alpert was defrauded when sold an ineffective tax shelter, all 
he was entitled to was the difference between what he paid and 
what he received—presumably the amount paid less any value of 
the tax shelter assets.120  Of course, he could not recover any tax 
benefits sought, since that type of recovery would give him the 
benefit of what he was promised, which is precisely what Reno 
held was not recoverable.121  Similarly, since a plaintiff in a fraud 
suit is only entitled to be made whole as of the time of the 
transaction, such a plaintiff cannot be heard to argue that he 
could have invested in an alternative arrangement that would 
have provided him with an effective tax shelter, since that would 
be the recovery of either profit or of indirect consequential 
damages.  In addition, the existence or availability of such an 
alternative arrangement would normally be undeterminable and 
speculative, and not recoverable for these reasons as well.122   
Subsequent to Alpert, the New York Court of Appeals again 
reiterated that the measure of damages for fraud in New York is 
still the Reno “out-of-pocket” rule and also approved Alpert’s 
holding that in such cases there is no recovery of any income 
taxes paid.123  In Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., the 
plaintiffs were a group of corporations which owned almost 
twenty-five percent of the defendant Smith Barney Inc., a 
brokerage firm.124  Giving in to pressure by the defendant, the 
plaintiff agreed to vote its shares in the defendant in favor of a 
 
118 See, e.g., Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 22–23, 
465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 618 (4th Dep’t 1983). 
119 See Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 74, 559 N.Y.S.2d 
312, 316 (1st Dep’t 1990). 
120 Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 314. 
121 In Reno, the measure of damages utilized by the lower court that was 
overturned was “the difference between the value of the stock at the time it was sold 
to [plaintiff] . . . and the value of the stock as it would have been at that time if the 
representations were true.” Reno, 226 N.Y. at 552–53, 124 N.E. at 146. 
122 See, e.g., Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 422, 668 
N.E.2d 1370, 1374, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 80 (1996); Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel 
Martinique Assocs., 12 N.Y.2d 339, 344, 190 N.E.2d 10, 12–13, 239 N.Y.S.2d 660, 
664 (1963). 
123 Lama Holding Co., 88 N.Y.2d at 421–23, 668 N.E.2d at 1373–74, 646 
N.Y.S.2d at 80–81. 
124 Id. at 418, 668 N.E.2d at 1372, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 78. 
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merger of the defendant into another entity, and to otherwise not 
block the merger.125  When the plaintiff was originally structured 
to hold the Smith Barney stock on behalf of foreign investors, it 
was structured so that any sales of the stock at a profit would not 
be subject to United States income taxation.126  Unbeknownst to 
the plaintiffs, the law was changed about six months before the 
merger and the plaintiffs later learned they had an unexpected 
tax liability of $33 million.127  They then brought this action 
asserting their consent to the merger was fraudulently induced, 
and seeking the $33 million as damages.128  Although the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of 
plaintiffs’ action, it extensively discussed the fraud measure of 
damages.129   
In Lama, the Court of Appeals, citing Reno, stated that 
“ ‘[t]he true measure of damage[s] is indemnity for the actual 
pecuniary loss sustained as the direct result of the wrong’ or 
what is known as the ‘out-of-pocket’ rule.”130  Under this rule, the 
court continued, the loss is computed as the difference between 
what the plaintiff paid and the value of what it received.131  A 
plaintiff could recover its losses but not what it might have 
gained nor any profit it might have realized absent the fraud.132  
Under the facts of Lama, the court held there were no damages 
because the price received for the Smith Barney stock in the 
merger was twice the shares’ fair market value.133  Any possible 
alternative arrangement that might have avoided the United 
States income tax could not be a basis for damages, since such 
arrangement was “undeterminable and speculative.”134  As to 
recovery of the taxes paid, the court stated these may not be 
recovered under the “out-of-pocket” rule, and endorsed Alpert’s 
analysis that the recovery of such taxes would put Lama in a  
 
 
125 Id. at 419–20, 668 N.E.2d at 1372, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 78–79. 
126 Id. at 418–19, 668 N.E.2d at 1372, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 78. 
127 Id. at 420, 668 N.E.2d at 1372–73, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 79. 
128 Id. at 419–20, 668 N.E.2d at 1372–73, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 79. There were also a 
number of other causes of action asserted. 
129 Id. at 421–23, 668 N.E.2d at 1373–74, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 79–81. 
130 Id. at 421, 668 N.E.2d at 1373, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 80. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 422, 668 N.E.2d at 1374, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 80. 
134 Id. 
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better position than if it had retained the shares.135  Such 
amounts apparently are beyond what is necessary to restore the 
plaintiff to the position occupied before the fraud.   
B. New York’s Negligence Measure of Damages 
In attempting to ascertain the New York measure of 
damages in a negligence cause of action—excluding personal 
injury situations—I was struck by the fact that there does not 
appear to be a clear, well-defined articulation of a standard that 
one may easily point to.  Unlike the fraud measure of damages 
that has been reaffirmed many times by the Court of Appeals 
and has an attractive short-hand label, the “out-of-pocket” rule, 
the negligence measure of damages is difficult to articulate.  A 
simple analog to the fraud’s “out-of-pocket” label does not seem to 
exist.  Similarly, the cases seem to raise different formulations of 
the measure of damages.  While the cases seem to want to make 
the plaintiff whole, they often do not explain their concept of 
“whole.”  For instance, does “whole” include any profit or 
consequential gains that non-negligent performance would have 
generated, or is it limited to actual pecuniary loss, akin to the 
fraud’s “out-of-pocket” measure of damages?  A very poignant 
illustration of this is Solin v. Domino.136  In Solin, the plaintiff 
was given incorrect advice by his insurance agent/financial 
advisor and by the insurance company as to the tax consequences 
of cashing in an annuity policy.  When it turned out the tax bill 
was $600,000 rather than the promised $200,000, the plaintiff 
sued for damages.137  Since the defendant “conceded that he had 
made a ‘mistake,’ ”138 the issue on the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss centered on damages.  While there were a number of 
potentially interesting side issues raised in the opinion, the 
federal trial judge, sitting in diversity, applied the fraud, out-of-




135 Id. at 422–23, 668 N.E.2d at 1374, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 80–81. 
136 No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 WL 536052 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009).  
137 Id. at *1. The plaintiff also argued that if he were furnished accurate 
information about his potential tax liability, he would have rolled over his annuity 
into another annuity thereby deferring all tax liability. Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at *4. 
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addressing the New York negligence measure of damages: 
“[t]abling the legal question whether benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages are recoverable in a negligence action under New York 
law.”140 
Although perhaps not glaringly obvious, and lacking a catchy 
label, the New York measure of damages in malpractice 
situations involving attorneys and accountants is very different 
from the fraud “out-of-pocket” approach.  The recovery available 
to an injured party is the difference between what was obtained 
by the plaintiff and what would have been obtained with non-
negligent performance.141 
In Flynn v. Judge, the plaintiffs were removed as executors 
and trustees of the estate of their father.142  They brought this 
action against the defendant, who was their attorney, claiming 
his negligent advice caused them to lose their positions and the 
income they would have received.143  In reviewing the trial court’s 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ causes of action, the Second 
Department stated, “[T]he measure of damages is the difference 
in the pecuniary position of the client from what it should have 
been had the attorney acted without negligence.”144  The court 
then quoted the following: 
In actions against attorneys for negligence or wrongs, the debt 
lost and cost sustained through their negligence furnish, when 
the action can be maintained, the obvious measure of damages, 
where this measure definitely exists.  In other cases the plaintiff 
is entitled to be in the same position as if the attorney had done 
his duty.145 
In Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe,146 the New 
York Court of Appeals addressed the proper measure of damages 
in an attorney malpractice situation.147  The majority’s opinion 
 
140 Id. at *3. 
141 Fly nn v. Judge, 149 A.D. 278, 279, 133 N.Y.S. 794, 795–96 (2d Dep’t 1912). 
142 Id. at 278, 133 N.Y.S. at 794. 
143 Id. at 279, 133 N.Y.S. at 795–96. 
144 Id. at 280, 133 N.Y.S. at 796. 
145 Id. (quoting EDWARD P. WEEKS, TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS 
AT LAW § 319 (2d ed. 1892)). 
146 76 N.Y.2d 38, 555 N.E.2d 611, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1990). 
147 The issue before the court was whether in a legal malpractice action the 
defendant attorney could offset against any recoverable damages the contingent fee 
provided for in the retainer agreement concerning the underlying personal injury 
claim. Id. at 39, 555 N.E.2d at 611, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 239. Here the defendant 
attorney settled the plaintiff’s personal injury claim with the insurer of the car that 
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was ambiguous concerning the precise scope of damages 
recoverable.  It stated that where a plaintiff asserts causes of 
action in both negligence and contract, the measure of damages 
in a legal malpractice action is generally the same.148  “The object 
of compensatory damages is to make the injured client whole.  
Where the injury suffered is the loss of a cause of action, the 
measure of damages is generally the value of the claim lost.”149  
While the majority’s opinion is not specific about what it means 
to make the injured client “whole,” the concurrence by Judge 
Kaye was much more explicit: 
In lawyer malpractice cases, as in all negligence cases, the focus 
in damages inquiries must be on the injured plaintiff—not on 
whether damages will unduly harm the wrongdoer defendant—
the objective being to put the injured plaintiff in as good a 
position as she would have been in had there been no breach of 
duty.150 
In Sanders v. Rosen,151 another attorney malpractice case, 
the court seemed to spell out what it means to make an injured 
party whole, writing “damages for malpractice are also limited to 
pecuniary loss—i.e., the difference between the actual result 
achieved and that which should have been accomplished, and the 
financial loss thereby sustained.”152 
Finally, the well-known New York requirement, that in a 
malpractice suit against an attorney for the loss of a cause of 
action there often needs to be a trial within a trial,153 is simply a 
direct application of this measure of damages.  The “trial” of the 
underlying lost cause of action within the malpractice trial is 




hit the plaintiff. The attorney failed to give notice of the accident to the plaintiff’s 
insurer, thereby losing coverage under plaintiff’s policy with much higher limits. Id. 
at 40–41, 555 N.E.2d at 612, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 240. 
148 Id. at 42, 555 N.E.2d at 613, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 241.  
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 45–46, 555 N.E.2d at 615, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 243. 
151 159 Misc. 2d 563, 605 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1993). 
152 Id. at 572, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 810. 
153 See, e.g., McKenna v. Forsyth & Forsyth, 280 A.D.2d 79, 82, 720 N.Y.S.2d 
654, 656–57, (4th Dep’t 2001); 3 Cottage Place LLC v. Cohen, Tauber, Spievack & 
Wagner, LLP, No. 0118036/2005, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8343, at *10–11 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. Cnty. Feb. 21, 2008); Alva v. Hurley, Fox, Selig, Caprari & Kelleher, 156 Misc. 
2d 550, 555, 593 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (Sup. Ct. Rockland Cnty. 1993). 
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attorney should have accomplished, which is the reference point 
in defining the extent of the recoverable injury suffered by the 
injured plaintiff. 
While the malpractice or negligence measure of damages 
seems identical with the “benefit-of-the-bargain” rule of damages 
utilized in breach of contract cases in New York,154 and since the 
cases do not affix the “benefit-of-the-bargain,” or, indeed, any 
label to this measure of damages,155 I will refer to them as 
“expectancy” damages—the difference between the expected non-
negligent performance of the tax advisor and actual performance. 
While, perhaps, all of the intricacies of New York expectancy 
damages in tax malpractice situations may not yet have been 
addressed,156 it seems clear that such expectancy damages are 
much broader than “out-of-pocket” damages available in fraud 
actions.  In fraud actions the plaintiff is generally made whole by 
receiving the difference between what he received and what he 
gave up.  Profits that may have been anticipated are not 
recoverable.  In expectancy damages the plaintiff may recover the 
entire difference between what the expected, non-negligent 
performance would have resulted in and what was actually 
received.157  This does not exclude recovery of any expected 
profits, as “out-of-pocket” fraud damages does. 
Where the advice sought is tax advice, it would seem 
inevitable that expectancy damages would include any extra 
taxes caused by the advisor’s negligence.  While authority in New 
 
154 The classic description of breach of contract damages is contained in Sager v. 
Friedman, 270 N.Y. 472, 1 N.E.2d 971 (1936): “The measure of damages which flows 
from a breach of contract is the difference between the value of what has been 
received under the contract and the value of what would have been received if the 
contract had been performed according to its terms. . . . The injured party is entitled 
to the benefit of his bargain as written and is entitled to damages for the loss caused 
by failure to perform the stipulated bargain.” Id. at 481, 1 N.E.2d at 974. This seems 
virtually identical with the definition of attorney malpractice damages as the 
difference between the injured party’s position and “what it should have been had 
the attorney acted without negligence.” Flynn v. Judge, 149 A.D. 278, 280, 133 
N.Y.S. 794, 796 (2d Dep’t 1912). 
155 See, e.g., Solin v. Domino, No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 WL 536052 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 25, 2009). In this case a federal judge specifically sidestepped whether benefit-
of-the-bargain damages are recoverable in negligence in New York. Id. at *3. 
156 See generally Todres, supra note 1. 
157 Any costs incurred would also be recoverable. Sanders, 159 Misc. 2d at 572, 
605 N.Y.S.2d at 810. 
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York on this may be scarce,158 there are many examples of such 
recoveries in other states.  For instance, recovery of additional 
taxes has been awarded where: (1) an attorney for an estate filed 
the estate tax return late, thereby preventing the estate from 
utilizing the alternate valuation date;159 (2) an attorney/return 
preparer advised that certain deductions be taken in a later year 
and when the error was discovered it was too late to file amended 
returns for the earlier years in which the deductions should have 
been claimed;160 (3) an “attorney” failed to obtain long-term 
capital gain treatment that was obtainable with better 
planning;161 and (4) erroneous advice resulted in the receipt of 
taxable rather than tax-free disability benefits.162 
The crucial issue in expectancy damages is to distinguish 
between additional taxes caused by the negligence and those 
taxes that are unconnected with the negligence and which would 
have been incurred in any event.  The former are recoverable, the 
latter are not.163 
The [plaintiffs] were, and are, under a legal duty to pay 
taxes . . . . We note that if the malpractice action ripens, the 
appropriate measure of damages is the difference between what 
the [plaintiffs] would have owed in any event if the tax returns 
were properly prepared, and what they owe now because of 
their accountants’ negligence, plus incidental damages.  The 
[plaintiffs] should not recover as damages all taxes owed . . . .164 
 
158 See, e.g., Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn LLP v. Munao, 270 A.D.2d 
150, 704 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1st Dep’t 2000). 
159 Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Iowa 1975). 
160 King v. Neal, 19 P.3d 899, 900 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001). 
161 Pytka v. Gadsby Hannah LLP, No. 01-1546 BLS, 2002 WL 31862712, at *3 
(Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2002). Here the individual defendant was not actually an 
attorney though he was held out to be an attorney and of counsel at the defendant 
law firm. The court treated him as if he were an attorney. Id. at *8. 
162 Jamison, Money, Farmer & Co. v. Standeffer, 678 So. 2d 1061, 1066–67 (Ala. 
1996). For other examples, see Todres, supra note 1, at 713–14. 
163 See Todres, supra note 1, at 712–13. 
164 Thomas v. Cleary, 768 P.2d 1090, 1091 n.5 (Alaska 1989); see also Hosfelt v. 
Miller, No. 97-JE-50, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5506, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 
2000) (“Although necessary taxes may not constitute an injury to a client’s interests, 
taxes which could have been avoided by the exercise of the knowledge, skill and 
ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by legal professionals under similar 
circumstances can be considered as an injury.”). 
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C. Extension of Alpert’s Fraud Measure of Damages to the 
Negligence Arena 
Although the measure of damages in fraud is so very 
different from the measure of damages in negligence, a number 
of cases have ignored this difference and simply relied upon 
Alpert in deciding negligence cases.165  It seems almost beyond 
comprehension why the courts do not even acknowledge, much 
less explain why, they are taking a rule from one area of law and 
are simply applying it in another, very different area.  To make 
matters worse, they are also ignoring long-established precedent 
in the negligence area.  Perhaps the most egregious example is 
Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. Sol Masch & Co.166  Gertler 
involved an action against an accountant for professional 
malpractice.  Fraud was never even mentioned in the opinion.  In 
affirming the trial court’s directed verdict dismissing the 
complaint, the First Department, citing only Alpert, held simply, 
“taxes and tax interest are not recoverable under New York 
law.”167  While Gertler said so, there simply is no such rule in the 
negligence arena. 
Similarly, in Solin v. Domino,168 a federal district court 
sitting in diversity and applying New York law simply applied 
the fraud “out-of-pocket” rule as the measure of damages for a 
negligence and malpractice cause of action.169  The court then 
proceeded to hold, citing Alpert, that the defendant could not 
recover his tax payment because that would place him “in a 
better position than he held prior to the misrepresentation.”170  
Again, this does not seem to be an accurate statement of the 
Flynn v. Judge expectancy rule of damages in the negligence 
arena. 
 
165 See, e.g., Menard M. Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. Sol Masch & Co., 40 A.D.3d 282, 
283, 835 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (1st Dep’t 2007); Shaiman v. Carpet One of The 
Hamptons, Inc., No. BRC 208-08, 27 Misc. 3d 1232(A), 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1551, 
at *9 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. June 9, 2010); Apple Bank for Sav. v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, No. 603492/06, 23 Misc. 3d 1126(A), 2009 WL 
1363026, at *6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 70 A.D.3d 438, 895 
N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep’t 2010); see also Solin v. Domino, No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 
WL 536052, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009). 
166 40 A.D.3d 282, 835 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1st Dep’t 2007). 
167 Id. at 283, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 179. 
168 No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 WL 536052 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009). 
169 Id. at *3. 
170 Id. 
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While Alpert, under its facts, may have been correct not to 
award back taxes to the plaintiffs because any such award would 
have put them in a better position than if they had never 
invested in the tax shelter at issue,171 there is no reason for the 
result in this particular fraud situation to be both transplanted 
to the negligence area and also to be elevated into an across-the-
board rule of law.  For instance, under the Flynn v. Judge 
measure of damages, the additional taxes incurred due to a tax 
advisor’s negligence in the following previously mentioned 
illustrative situations should be recoverable just as they were 
held to be recoverable in other states: 
1. where the benefit of utilizing the alternate valuation date for  
estate tax purposes was lost due, to the late filing of the  
estate tax return by the estate’s attorney;172 
2. where the tax advisor incorrectly advises a deduction be  
taken in a later year rather than in the proper earlier year  
and the benefit of the deduction is lost;173  
3. where a client fails to obtain favorable long term capital gain  
treatment that otherwise would have been available because  
the advisor miscalculated the holding period necessary to  
obtain long term treatment;174 and 
4. where an advisor gives incorrect advice as to how to purchase  
insurance coverage and the benefits later received are  
taxable rather than tax-free.175 
In each situation, the additional taxes would not have been 
incurred but for the advisor’s negligence, and should be 
recoverable. 
Similarly, while Alpert’s holding “that the victim of fraud 
may not recover the benefit of an alternative agreement 
overlooked in favor of the fraudulent one”176 may have been 
 
171 Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 71–72, 559 N.Y.S.2d 
312, 314–15 (1st Dep’t 1990). The court never explained what it meant by this 
statement. In fraud, the purpose of damages is to restore the party to the position 
occupied immediately before the commission of the fraud. Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 
314. Presumably, any recovery of taxes would enrich the plaintiff vis-à-vis never 
having invested in the tax shelter, notwithstanding the shelter’s promise of a large 
tax reduction. 
172 See, e.g., Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Iowa 1975). 
173 See, e.g., King v. Neal, 19 P.3d 899, 900–01 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001). 
174 See, e.g., Pytka v. Gadsby Hannah LLP, No. 01-1546 BLS, 2002 WL 
31677458, at *3 (Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2002). 
175 See, e.g., Jamison, Money, Farmer & Co. v. Standeffer, 678 So. 2d 1061, 
1066–67 (Ala. 1996). 
176 Alpert, 160 A.D.2d. at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315. 
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correct in that case, this too should not be extended as absolute 
doctrine in the negligence area.  In Alpert, the attorneys who 
rendered opinions concerning the subject tax shelter had 
absolutely no connection with, or even notice of, what other 
investments the investors might have been considering.  The 
alternative investment was completely extraneous to the 
defendants’ role in the shelter at issue.  Contrast this with a 
situation in which a layman who is considering investing in one 
of two tax shelters seeks advice from an expert as to which 
shelter is efficacious.  Here, if the advisor, due to negligence, 
advises the purchase of option B rather than option A and it 
turns out that B is invalid while A is valid, the additional taxes 
incurred ought to be recoverable.  But for the negligence, the 
client’s pecuniary position would have been better by the taxes 
that could have been saved. 
Solin v. Domino provides an interesting case study in the 
jurisprudential mischief created by applying Alpert’s fraud 
measure of damages in the negligence arena.177  In Solin the 
basic analysis is flawed, since the court utilized the fraud 
measure of damages rather than the negligence measure of 
damages in dismissing the plaintiff’s cause of action on a motion 
to dismiss.  However, the alternative holding in Solin that the 
plaintiff cannot recover any damages since the only damages 
asserted were speculative, might plausibly be a correct result, 
even if the proper legal standard had been applied. 
In Solin, the plaintiff,178 under the federal court’s diversity 
jurisdiction, sued his insurance agent/financial advisor for 
professional malpractice and negligent misrepresentation.179  The 
crux of the complaint was that the defendant understated the tax 
that would be incurred if the plaintiff were to cash in his annuity 
policy.  The plaintiff had an annuity worth approximately $3.2 
 
177 No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 WL 536052 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009). 
178 There were actually two plaintiffs in Solin: Daniel Solin, individually, and as 
trustee of the Daniel R. Solin Trust. Id. at *1. For ease of presentation, they are 
treated as one plaintiff since the issues for both were identical and the court also 
treated them as one. 
179 Id. at *1. In the final footnote of the opinion the court noted that since the 
plaintiff’s cause of action was defective because it failed to assert any recoverable 
damages, the court did not need to address the defendant’s alternative argument 
that New York law does not recognize a professional malpractice cause of action 
against financial advisors. Id. at *4 n.7. The discussion herein also does not address 
this contention.  
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million.  The plaintiff was contemplating one of two courses of 
action: whether to (1) surrender the annuity, pay the taxes and 
invest the balance in a taxable account; or (2) roll over the 
annuity tax-free into another annuity.180  If the second option was 
selected, no taxes would be currently incurred, but would be 
deferred until the new annuity was cashed in.  Based on the 
defendant’s advice that approximately $200,000 of taxes would 
be incurred currently if option one was chosen and the annuity 
cashed in, the plaintiff chose option one.  It later turned out that 
the actual tax liability was over $600,000 rather than the advised 
$200,000.  When confronted about the discrepancy, the defendant 
admitted that he had made a mistake.  This suit was commenced 
because the plaintiff asserted he would have selected the second 
option if he had been given accurate advice.181   
At the beginning of its analysis, the court in Solin noted that 
to recover under either of the asserted causes of action, the 
plaintiff would have to prove proximate and actual damages.182  
Speculative damages were not recoverable under New York 
law.183  The court noted that damages were speculative when the 
fact that damages were incurred is uncertain, not merely when 
the amount of the damages was in dispute.184 
The applicable measure of damages, according to Solin, was 
that “[a] victim of negligence and malpractice may recover his 
out-of-pocket expenses that flow from the wrongful conduct (i.e., 
indemnity for actual pecuniary loss).”185  The court went on to 
hold that taxes were not recoverable by the plaintiff for two 
reasons: first, based on Lama Holding Co.,186 because the tax 
liability was caused by plaintiff having recognized taxable gain, 
not because of any misrepresentation by the defendant187; and 
 
180 Id. at *1; see I.R.C. § 1035 (2006). 
181 Solin, 2009 WL 536052, at *1. 
182 Id. at *2. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at *3. 
186 Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 668 N.E.2d 1370, 646 
N.Y.S.2d 76 (1996). 
187 Solin, 2009 WL 536052, at *3. It should be noted that in Solin, the plaintiff 
first solicited and received the tax advice before cashing in the annuity. Id. at *1. 
This is in contrast to the situation in Alpert in which the plaintiff engaged in his 
normal economic endeavors during all of 1977 and purchased the tax shelter on 
December 30th of that year. Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 160 A.D.2d 67, 
69, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (1st Dep’t 1990). 
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second, because any recovery of taxes would put the plaintiff in a 
better position than he held prior to the misrepresentation.  For 
this latter proposition the court relied on Alpert.188 
With all due respect, the court utilized the fraud measure of 
damages of both Lama Holding and Alpert as the rule of 
recoverable damages for the torts of professional malpractice and 
negligent misrepresentation.  The court did not even note the 
transplantation of a fraud rule into the negligence area.  Even 
worse, the court seems to have elevated statements in each of the 
fraud cases that may have been perfectly appropriate in their 
original contexts and made them into absolute tort rules that 
have no basis and make no sense in the tort arena.  These rules 
are that taxes may never be recovered under the out-of-pocket 
rule—which does not apply in tort cases—and that a recovery of 
back taxes would always put a plaintiff in a better position than 
before the wrong.189  Finally, it is suggested that the court’s 
approach, if followed, will make it impossible to ever recover the 
most elemental type of damages incurred in a tax malpractice 
context—additional taxes. 
Solin also gave short shrift to the plaintiff’s alternative 
argument that he ought to be able to recover as damages the 
difference between the taxes incurred on cashing in the annuity 
and what he would have incurred by utilizing the other option of 
deferring the taxes by exchanging the annuity for another 
annuity.  According to the court, such damages were speculative 
and not recoverable.  They were speculative because the amount 
of taxes ultimately incurred is not knowable because they will 
depend upon such factors as when the future tax liability will be 
incurred, what the plaintiff’s tax rate will be at that time, and 
whether there will have been any changes in—perhaps even 
elimination of—the tax law.190  The court also rejected the 
plaintiff’s attempt to shift the speculativeness problem to the 
defendant by arguing that the plaintiff was entitled to recover 
the full $600,000 of taxes currently paid and if the defendant 
wanted to reduce this amount by any taxes that would be saved 
in the future as a result of the present tax payment, the 
defendant had the burden of proof on this offset.  Since the  
 
 
188 Solin, 2009 WL 536052, at *3. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
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defendant certainly could not prove the amount of any offset due 
to its inherent speculativeness, the plaintiff, it was argued, 
should therefore be able to recover all the taxes paid currently.191   
It is suggested that a correct analysis of the Solin facts 
would be as follows:  Initially, the proper measure of damages in 
this malpractice situation would be, not the fraud out-of-pocket 
rule, but the expectancy—really, benefit-of-the-bargain—
measure of damages of Flynn v Judge.192  Under this rule of 
damages, a plaintiff could recover the difference between what 
his pecuniary position would have been if the tax advice were 
non-negligent and his present pecuniary situation.193  If extra 
taxes were caused by the negligent advice, such amounts would 
be recoverable. 
Applying this rule to the Solin facts, it is clear, as the court 
found, that there was no issue as to the defendant’s negligence or 
proximate cause.  The only issue for decision was damages—
whether the plaintiff proved his damages.  At this point, Solin’s 
analysis of the plaintiff’s alternative argument and the court’s 
discussion of the speculativeness of the damages and who has the 
burden of proof is completely apropos.  It would be a perfectly 
proper result for the court to hold that in New York the plaintiff 
has the burden of proving damages as an element of his cause of 
action.194  And, to do so, the plaintiff had to establish the 
difference between the currently incurred taxes, and what would 
have been incurred had he chosen the other option of deferring 
his taxes by rolling over his old annuity into a new one.  Not 
being able to prove this amount because of the speculativeness of 
the future taxes and not being able to shift this burden of proof 
onto the defendant, the Solin result of granting the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss would be correct, or at least, arguably 
correct.195 
Although the lower court in Apple Bank for Savings v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP196 also applied Alpert in a tort 
context, the opinion is noteworthy and merits discussion for two 
 
191 Id.  
192 Flynn v. Judge, 149 A.D. 278, 280, 133 N.Y.S. 794, 796 (2d Dep’t 1912). 
193 Id. 
194 See Solin, 2009 WL 536052, at *3 (citing Noah v. Harding, No. 2002-1351 QC, 
2003 WL 21974989, at *1 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep’t 2003). 
195 See Todres, supra note 1, at 758–65 (discussing this issue more fully). 
196 No. 603492/06, 23 Misc. 3d 1126(A), 2009 WL 1363026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 
Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 70 A.D.3d 438, 895 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep’t 2010). 
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reasons.  First, and most importantly, the court seems to have 
instinctively fathomed the correct standard for when taxes ought 
to be recoverable in tort situations and it interpreted Alpert and 
some its progeny as standing for this result.  Second, as did a 
number of other cases,197 the court combined its analysis of the 
recovery of taxes and of interest and treated them as a unit.  
While taxes and interest are often considered together,198 it is 
suggested that under Alpert this is not correct since the 
underlying rationale for each item is very different.  It is also 
suggested that while the court’s conclusion as to the 
recoverability of taxes may have reached an ultimately correct 
result, its conclusion as to interest was not correct. 
As discussed previously,199 in Apple Bank the plaintiff bank 
alleged that the defendant, its accounting firm, gave it incorrect 
advice as to the tax consequences of redeeming stock from the 
estate of its deceased sole shareholder.  As a result it incurred 
additional taxes and interest.200  The defendant moved for 
summary judgment dismissing the complaint, primarily on 
statute of limitations grounds and also because back taxes and 
interest are not recoverable under New York law.201  In 
addressing the latter issue, the court commenced its analysis 
with Alpert’s holding that the plaintiff could not recover the back 
taxes and interest “because plaintiff inevitably would have 
incurred the tax liability if it had not invested in the disallowed 
tax shelter.”202  Addressing the recovery of both back taxes and 
interest, the court concluded that under New York law back 
taxes and interest are recoverable if the plaintiff’s tax liability 
would have been avoided but for the erroneous advice.  Where 
the tax liability was inevitable, the court held there can be no 
recovery of interest and taxes since a recovery would create a 
windfall for the plaintiff.203 
 
197 See, e.g., Gaslow v. KPMG LLP, 19 A.D.3d 264, 265, 797 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 
(1st Dep’t 2005); Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger, 303 A.D.2d 249, 249, 
755 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (1st Dep’t 2003); Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. 
Supp. 2d 363, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), amended by, No. 03 Civ. 6942(SAS), 2004 WL 
2403911 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004). 
198 Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *6. 
199 See supra text accompanying notes 59–66. 
200 Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *1. 
201 Id. at *2.  
202 Id. at *7. 
203 Id. 
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While the court’s conclusion with respect to the recovery of 
taxes in New York is ultimately correct, the analysis is not.  The 
starting point in the court’s analysis should not have been Alpert 
but rather Flynn v Judge.  Under Flynn’s expectancy measure of 
damages in negligence, a plaintiff may recover the difference 
between what his pecuniary position would have been if the 
advice received were non-negligent and his present pecuniary 
situation.204  Under this standard it directly follows that any 
additional taxes that would have been avoided with non-
negligent advice would be recoverable. 
As to the Apple Bank court’s analysis of the recoverability of 
interest, it is suggested that if the court’s starting point was 
Alpert, which it was, its analysis and conclusion is incorrect.  The 
reason for this is because the crux of Alpert’s holding that 
interest is not recoverable is because the court did not view the 
payment of interest as damages.  It was merely an appropriate 
charge for the plaintiff’s use of the government’s tax money 
during the time the plaintiff was not entitled to the money.  
Under Alpert’s presumption that the value of the money to the 
plaintiff always equals the interest charge paid the government, 
there simply are no damages to recover.  Under this analysis, 
interest should never be recoverable, even when the back taxes 
were avoidable with non-negligent advice. 
CONCLUSION 
Although I have previously stated my view that Alpert’s 
holdings prohibiting the recovery of both interest on a tax 
underpayment and additional taxes should be changed and that 
such recoveries should be allowed in New York in negligence 
causes of action, a considered analysis of Alpert must extend 
beyond a simple conclusion that Alpert was wrongly decided.  In 
fact, Alpert was correctly decided.  Alpert involved a fraud cause 
of action.  In deciding that additional taxes were not recoverable 
and that any tax savings that could have been obtained by an 
investment in another viable tax shelter was irrelevant, Alpert 





204 Flynn v. Judge, 149 A.D. 278, 280, 133 N.Y.S. 794, 796 (2d Dep’t 1912). 
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governing the recovery of fraud damages in New York.  These 
principles were established in 1919 in Reno v. Bull205 and 
followed consistently since then.206 
With respect to Alpert’s holding that interest on a tax 
underpayment was not recoverable, again it is impossible to 
simply suggest that this holding is erroneous.  In fact, the 
holding was quite progressive and very perceptive of a wrong 
outcome resulting from the majority view’s simplistic allowance 
of the recovery of such interest as a normal element of 
recoverable tort damages.207  While Alpert was addressing a fraud 
cause of action, it very perceptively understood, and held, that 
interest on a tax underpayment does not factually constitute 
damages.  The plaintiff had use of the government’s tax money 
for some period of time when not entitled to the money, and 
simply reimbursing the government for wrongly hypothecating 
the use of the money was, according to Alpert, very appropriate.  
In fact, according to the court, if such interest were recoverable, 
plaintiffs would always have the unwarranted windfall of having 
had the interest-free use of money.  Probably the harshest 
criticism possible of this portion of Alpert’s holding is that the 
court was not prescient enough to recognize the criticism that 
would be leveled at this result by the later, modern view.  
However, Alpert represented an appropriate, evolutionary step in 
the development of the law on the recoverability of such interest.  
Now, that the modern view has taken root which permits the 
litigants to establish precisely whether more interest was paid to 
the government than was earned by having use of this money, 
this view is superior to Alpert’s approach and New York should 
adopt it.  Arguably, this was accomplished by Jamie Towers,208 
but, as indicated previously,209 Jamie Towers has been completely 
overshadowed by Alpert despite the fact that it was decided later 
by the same court that decided Alpert. 
In contemplating the current state of New York law 
governing the damages recoverable by an injured plaintiff from a 
negligent tax advisor, it is most perplexing why the courts did 
not, and still do not, simply apply New York’s traditional 
 
205 226 N.Y. 546, 552–53, 124 N.E. 144, 146 (1919). 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 105–17 and 123–35. 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 93–94.  
208 296 A.D.2d 359, 745 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1st Dep’t 2002). 
209 See supra text accompanying notes 44–58. 
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negligence expectancy measure of damages in this area.  In 1912, 
Flynn v. Judge210 very clearly articulated that the measure of 
damages in such negligence situations is the difference between 
the plaintiff’s present economic position and what it would have 
been with non-negligent performance.  This negligence measure 
of damages was endorsed by the New York Court of Appeals in 
1990,211 and has been applied by other lower courts.212  Why have 
the courts extended the holdings of Alpert, a fraud case, to the 
tax malpractice area, instead of applying the directly relevant 
negligence measure of damages that has been New York law for 
almost a hundred years? 
With respect to Alpert’s holding that interest is not 
recoverable, perhaps it can be suggested that since this involved 
a theory under which no damages were found to exist as a factual 
matter, it was permissible to utilize this same theory even in a 
negligence context.  However, there seems to be no 
jurisprudential justification for taking Alpert’s holdings with 
respect to taxes and transporting them to the negligence arena. 
There might be one rather cynical explanation of why Alpert, 
rather than long-standing negligence principles was applied in 
this area, and that is to minimize potential damages faced by 
errant professionals.  Under Alpert additional taxes and interest 
on a tax underpayment are not recoverable from a negligent 
defendant, while such amounts213 would be recoverable under 
traditional negligence doctrine.  New York has a record of being 
very protective of its defendant professionals—attorneys and 
accountants—and, correspondingly, very parsimonious towards 
injured plaintiffs.  For instance, New York has a very strict rule 
for when the statute of limitations commences in such situations.  
It commences when the malpractice act was performed, despite 
the fact that the injury might not be discoverable for some period 
of time.214  There is no suspension of the statue while the wrong 
 
210 149 A.D. 278, 133 N.Y.S. 794 (2d Dep’t 1912). 
211 Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 555 N.E.2d 611, 556 
N.Y.S.2d 239 (1990). 
212 See, e.g., Sanders v Rosen, 159 Misc. 2d 563, 605 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
Cnty. 1993). 
213 With respect to interest, only the interest differential should be recoverable. 
214 Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 84 N.Y.2d 535, 538, 541, 644 N.E.2d 1009, 
1010, 1011–12, 620 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319, 320–21 (1994); see also Williamson v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 9 N.Y.3d 1, 7–8, 872 N.E.2d 842, 845, 840 N.Y.S.2d 
730, 733 (2007). 
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could not reasonably have been discovered.215  Similarly, New 
York has very strict privity rules limiting who may bring a 
malpractice cause of action.216  
Also, in a four to three opinion, the New York Court of 
Appeals recently refused to modify existing principles of agency 
law and the in pari delicto defense to somewhat weaken current 
protection afforded to errant or negligent gatekeeper 
defendants.217  The minority characterized the effect of the 
majority opinion as “effectively preclud[ing] litigation by 
derivative corporate plaintiffs or litigation trustees to recover 
against negligent or complicit outside actors—even where the 
outside actor, hired to perform essential gatekeeping and 
monitoring functions, actively colludes with corrupt corporate 
insiders.”218 
It would be quite disheartening to imagine that New York’s 
jurisprudence was being distorted simply to achieve a pro-
defendant, anti-plaintiff result. 
In conclusion, it is rather inexplicable why Alpert’s holding 
as to the fraud measure of damages was ever applied to govern 
the recoverability of additional taxes in the negligence arena of 
tax malpractice.  As to the extension of Alpert’s no-interest-
recovery rationale to the tax malpractice area, while this might 
originally have seemed acceptable, or at least justifiable, not as a 
matter of negligence doctrine, but as a theory addressing the 
factual existence or nonexistence of damages, it no longer seems 
appropriate in light of the subsequent development of the modern 
approach that precisely measures any damages resulting from 
the payment of interest to a government.  The proper course of 
action seems obvious.  New York should revert to its 
longstanding traditional negligence measure of damages in the 
tax malpractice segment of the negligence arena.  Expectancy 
 
215 See, e.g., Williamson, 9 N.Y.3d at 7–8, 872 N.E.2d at 845, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 
733. 
216 See, e.g., Estate of Schneider v. Finmann, 15 N.Y.3d 306, 933 N.E.2d 718, 907 
N.Y.S.2d 119 (2010), in which the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed the general 
application of “strict privity” in estate planning malpractice claims, though it held 
the personal representative of an estate does have privity to sue a negligent estate 
planner on behalf of the estate. Id. at 309–10, 933 N.E.2d at 720–21, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 
121–22. 
217 Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 938 N.E.2d 941, 912 N.Y.S.2d 508 
(2010). 
218 Id. at 477, 938 N.E.2d at 959, 912 N.Y.S.2d at 526 (Ciparick, J., dissenting). 
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damages should be recoverable.  This would include additional 
taxes as well as any interest differential between the interest 
paid the government and the interest earned by the plaintiff on 
the underpaid taxes.  In accordance with its longstanding 
jurisprudence of requiring a plaintiff to prove his damages, the 
burden of proving the amount of the interest differential should 
be upon the plaintiff. 
 
